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Distillation: An Effective Response to the Wine 
Surplus in the European Community? 
INTRODUCTION 
During the 1970s, a structural surplus l in the market for table 
wine2 emerged within the European Community (EC or Com-
munity).3 Since then, the problem of surplus table wine has 
plagued the Community.4 This surplus is due to the combination 
of several factors, including the increased production of wine.5 
From 1970 to 1983, the annual rate of increase was 1 percent.6 
Recent years have shown an even greater rate of increase. 7 An-
other factor contributing to the surplus is the decreasing con-
sumption of wine within the Community.8 Total wine consump-
tion within the main wine producing Member States9 declined by 
approximately 20 percent over a IS-year period from the early 
1970s to the mid-1980s.1O Additionally, Spain and Portugal joined 
the EC in 1986 and have significantly added to wine production 
within the Community.ll Because these factors are of a structural 
nature, only affirmative action on the part of the EC can restore 
equilibrium to the wine market. 
I A "structural surplus" refers to a permanent overproduction and the problem of 
disposing of stocks. 1992 Euroscope: Agriculture, Coopers & Lybrand, Aug. 27, 1992, 
available in LEXIS, Europe Library, AHeur File, at *2.2 [hereinafter Agriculture Report). 
2 Table wine is most easily understood as a lower quality wine. The European Com-
munity [hereinafter EC or Community) has outlined several technical requirements for 
qualification as table wine. See Council Regulation 822/87, Annex I, ~ 13, 1987 0.]. (L 
84) 1,44 [hereinafter Regulation 822/87). 
3 Court of Auditors, Special Report No. 4/87 on Community Wine Distillation Measures 
Accompanied by the Commission's Replies, 1987 OJ. (C 297) 14, 16 [hereinafter Special 
Report). 
4 See Timo Kortteinen, Alcoholic Beverages and Agriculture in the European Community, 
CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS., Winter 1990, at 497,501; Special Report, supra note 3, at 16. 
5 See Kortteinen, supra note 4, at 501; see also Commission Proposals on the Prices for 
Agricultural Products and on Related Measures, COM(87) I final at 77 [hereinafter Com-
mission Proposals). 
6 Kortteinen, supra note 4, at 501. 
7 See id.; see also Special Report, supra note 3, at 18. 
S Kortteinen, supra note 4, at 50 I; see Special Report, supra note 3, at 16, 20; Commission 
Proposals, supra note 5, at 77. 
9 Of the ten Member States during the time period considered, Italy, France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Greece, and Luxembourg produced wine. Special Report, supra 
note 3, at 17. 
10 Id. at 20. 
II See Kortteinen, supra note 4, at 521; see also EC Executive Draws Up Plans to Cut Wine 
Surplus, Reuters, Mar. 2, 1988, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, Intl File. 
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Currently, the wine market within the EC is regulated as part 
of the Community's common agricultural policy (CAP).12 Under 
CAP, a common organization of the market l3 in wine, commonly 
referred to as the "wine regime," has been established. 14 Since 
the general purpose of the wine regime is to establish an efficient 
and profitable wine market,15 attempts to eliminate the wine sur-
plus have been and continue to be made through the structure 
of the regime. 
The distillation of table wine is one of the various measures l6 
taken in response to the wine surplusY It has developed into a 
major device for addressing the problem. 18 Although originally 
intended as a temporary remedy designed to deal with short-
term imbalances, distillation has been used continually in the face 
of the persistent wine surplus. 19 The Community, through the 
use of a price system and aid granting, supports the distillation 
of wine for conversion into alcohol with a view toward eliminating 
the surplus. 20 Given the existence of a wine surplus for close to 
12 See Kortteinen, supra note 4, at 498-99. Common agricultural policy principles pro-
vide for the establishment of special market organizations to market agricultural products, 
including wine. Id. 
13 "Common organization of the market" is the expression used to refer to all basic 
regulations on agricultural products. Agriculture Report, supra note I, at *3.1. 
14 See Regulation 822/87, supra note 2. The common organization of the market in wine 
consists of "rules governing production and control of the development of wine-growing 
potential, rules governing oenological practices and processes, a price system and rules 
governing intervention and other measures to improve market conditions, arrangements 
for trade with third countries, and rules governing circulation and release to the market." 
Id. at art. 1. Regulation 822/87 supersedes Regulation 337179 which also provided for the 
common organization of the market in wine. See Council Regulation 337179, 19790.]. 
(L 54) I [hereinafter Regulation 337179]. 
15 One commentator has outlined the main goals of the wine regime as follows: 
to secure the income of the farming sector and stabilize prices in order to achieve 
a balance of supply and demand within the Community; to regulate trade with 
third countries in a coordinated manner; to promote structural reform within 
agriculture toward greater productivity and rationalization; and to ensure equi-
table supplies for consumers. 
Kortteinen, supra note 4, at 500. 
16 Stockpiling and grubbing-up, i.e., digging up vines for conversion to other land uses, 
are some of the measures encouraged and supported by the Community. See id. at 508; 
Commission Proposals, supra note 5, at 77. 
17 See Regulation 822/87, supra note 2, at arts. 35,36,38,39,41,42. 
18 Special Report, supra note 3, at 16; Commission Proposals, supra note 5, at 83. 
19 Kortteinen, supra note 4, at 506. At least 18 million hectolitres of wine will be sent 
out for distillation as a result of overproduction in the 1991-92 wine year. Internal Market; 
No. 1728, Wine: No Less Than 18 Million HL Destined for Distillation in 1991, EUR. REP. (Eur. 
Info. Serv.), Dec. II, 1991, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, Inti File. 
20 See Regulation 822/87, supra note 2, at arts. 27-51. 
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two decades, the continued use of distillation as a remedial re-
sponse is questionable. 
This Comment assesses the usefulness of distillation as a re-
sponse to the wine surplus. Part I outlines the distillation mea-
sures as prescribed by various regulations. Part II evaluates the 
effectiveness of the distillation measures. Part III suggests alter-
native methods to address more effectively the wine surplus. This 
Comment concludes, first, that distillation is an inadequate mea-
sure for addressing the wine surplus because it fails to address 
the root of the problem, and second, that structural reform of 
the wine regime is needed to eliminate the wine surplus. 
1. THE DISTILLATION MEASURES 
The wine regime provides for six different distillation mea-
sures: three compulsory measures21 and three voluntary mea-
sures.22 For both compulsory and voluntary measures, the distiller 
gives the producer a minimum price, called the "buying-in price," 
which varies according to the measure and type of wine or wine 
by-product that is to be distilled.23 The buying-in price is calcu-
lated as a percentage of a "guide price" set by the EC Council 
(Council) annually.24 The distiller is then entitled to distillation 
aid for any amount distilled.25 This aid is calculated to compen-
sate the distiller for the difference between its costs and the price 
of alcohol on the open market.26 Alternatively, in the case of 
compulsory distillation, the distiller may surrender the resultant 
alcohol to an intervention agency rather than trying to sell it 
independently.27 Either avenue is available to the distiller if the 
distilled product meets certain minimum alcoholic strengths.28 
21 See id. at arts. 35, 36, 39. 
22 See id. at arts. 38,41,42. 
23 See id. at arts. 35, 36, 38, 39,41,42. 
24 [d. Each year, the EC Council [hereinafter Council] establishes a guide price for each 
type of table wine. [d. at art. 27, ~ 2. It is based on the average of prices recorded for the 
type of wine in question during the two previous years and on the price trends during 
the current year. [d. at art. 27, ~ 3. It is meant to reflect a fair income for producers. 
Special Report, supra note 3, at 21. 
25 [d. at arts. 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 42. 
26 See Council Regulation 2046/89, arts. 7, ~ 1, 16, 1989 O.J. (L 202) 14; see also Special 
Report, supra note 3, at 21. The aid is chargeable to the European Agricultural Guarantee 
and Guidance Fund. See Kortteinen, supra note 4, at 515. 
27 See Regulation 822/87, supra note 2, at arts. 35, ~ 6, 36, ~ 4, 39, ~ 7. 
28 See id. 
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A. Compulsory Distillation Measures 
There are three different compulsory distillation measures that 
require producers to turn over a portion of their production for 
distillation. Two of the measures are automatically implemented 
every year: compulsory distillation of the by-products of wine-
making and compulsory distillation of wines other than table 
wines. 29 The EC Commission (Commission) initiates the third 
measure-compulsory distillation of table wines-when certain 
circumstances arise. 30 
Compulsory distillation of by-products requires any natural or 
legal person or group of persons to turn over for distillation all 
by-products of winema king and all by-products of any type of 
grape processing other than vinification. 31 By-products consist of 
grape marc and wine lees which remain after grapes and wine 
lees have been pressed.32 When surrendered for distillation, these 
by-products must meet certain minimum alcoholic strengths.33 
The distillers determine the buying-in price based on the alco-
holic strength of the by-products.34 By requiring producers to 
distill their by-products, the EC endeavors to prevent the over-
pressing of grape marcs and wine lees and the sale of inferior 
quality wines with a low alcohol content.35 
Other than table wine, there are two types of wine that are 
required to be turned over for compulsory distillation: wine made 
from grapes not of a winemaking variety; and wine made from 
grapes of both a winemaking variety and a variety suitable for 
other purposes when production of such wine exceeds normal 
production. 36 The buying-in price paid to producers by distillers 
for these wines is 50 percent of the guide price for a certain type 
29 See id. at arts. 35, 36. 
30 See id. at art. 39, ~ I. 
3l!d. at art. 35, ~~ 2, 3. 
32 See id. at art. 35, ~ 1. "Wine lees" refers to "the residue accumulating in vessels 
containing wine after fermentation, during storage or after authorized treatment and the 
residue obtained from filtering or centrifuging this product." Id. at Annex I, ~ 20. "Grape 
marc" refers to "the residue from the pressing of fresh grapes whether or not fermented." 
Id. at Annex I, ~ 21. 
33 See id. at art. 35, ~~ 2, 3. Certain exceptions to distillation are permitted whereby by-
products may be destroyed under supervision or withdrawn. Id. at art. 35, ~~ 3, 5. 
34 !d. at art. 35, ~ 7. 
35 See id. at art. 35, ~ 1. 
36 Regulation 822/87, supra note 2, at art. 36, ~~ 1, 2. Normal production is determined 
with respect to quantities used in traditional manners produced during a certain reference 
period. Id. at art. 36, ~ 2. 
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of table wine.37 By guaranteeing such a low price for their wines, 
the EC hopes to penalize producers for production or overprod-
uction of inferior wines, thereby ultimately discouraging produc-
tion in general. 
The Commission may exercise the third type of compulsory 
distillation-distillation of table wines-if a serious imbalance ex-
ists in the market.38 When such an imbalance exists, the Com-
mission establishes the quantity to be distilled with a view toward 
eliminating enough surplus to restore normal market condi-
tions. 39 This obligatory quantity is shared among the wine-pro-
ducing regions within the Community.40 
Once the Commission sets a particular region's quantity for 
distillation, producers within the region must distill a percentage 
of their production,4l Producers may deduct quantities already 
delivered for preventive distillation42 from the quantity required 
for compulsory distillation.43 Originally, the buying-in price for 
these types of wine was set at 50 percent of the relevant guide 
price for the first 12.5 million hectolitres and 40 percent of the 
guide price for quantities above that level for the 1986-87 and 
1987-88 wine years. 44 Today, the buying-in price is fixed when 
compulsory distillation is elected.45 As in the case of distillation 
37Id. at art. 36, ~ 3. 
38 Regulation 822/87, supra note 2, at art. 39, ~ 1. A serious imbalance is deemed to 
exist if: 
Id. 
(a) availabilities recorded at the beginning of the wine year exceed the level of 
normal utilization by more than four month's [sic] supply, or 
(b) production exceeds the level of normal utilization by more than 9%, or 
(c) the weighted average of representative prices for all types of table wine 
remains below 82% of the guide price from the beginning of a wine year for a 
period to be determined. 
39Id. at art. 39, ~ 2. 
4°Id. at art. 39, ~ 3. Each region is responsible for a quantity proportional to the 
difference between the production of table wine in that region during the year in question 
and a percentage of the average quantity of table wine produced in that region for a 
certain three-year period. Id. For the years through the 1989/90 wine year, the percentage 
used for a given region was 85 percent of the region's average quantity for 1981182 
through 1983/84. From 1990/91 onward, the Commission has been given the discretion 
to set both the percentage and the reference period to be used. Id. 
41Id. at art. 39, ~ 4. This percentage is determined according to a progressive scale 
based on the yield per hectare and may vary among regions according to previous yields. 
Id. 
42 See infra notes 46-52. 
43 Regulation 822/87, supra note 2, at art. 39, ~ 4. 
44 Id. at art. 39, ~6. 
45 Commission Regulation 441/88, art. 13, ~ 1, 1988 0.]. (L 45) 15, 21 [hereinafter 
Regulation 441188]. 
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of non-table wines, the low buying-in prices for table wines are 
intended to penalize producers for overproduction and to deter 
such voluminous production in the future. 
B. Voluntary Distillation Measures 
There are three voluntary distillation measures which produc-
ers may elect to exercise. Producers have the option of: (1) pre-
ventive distillation;46 (2) distillation supplementary to long-term 
storage contracts;47 and (3) support distillation.48 These measures 
allow wary producers to dispose of their production at guaran-
teed prices in anticipation of insufficient market demand. 
Producers may exercise preventive distillation when the Coun-
cil, in any given year, decides that harvest forecasts indicate that 
distillation will be necessary to improve the quality of products 
put on the market.49 Under this measure, producers surrender 
for distillation a portion of their production which may not ex-
ceed a certain quantity limit per producer. 50 The buying-in price 
payable to producers is 65 percent of the guide price of the table 
wine in question.51 This measure is meant to eliminate inferior 
quality wines at the beginning of the marketing year. 52 
Producers who have concluded long-term storage contracts 
may also opt for distillation if certain circumstances arise: other 
support measures must have proven inadequate; and the repre-
sentative price53 of the table wine in question must have remained 
below 92 percent of the guide price for three consecutive weeks.54 
If a producer elects to distill under this measure, it may deliver 
up to a specified maximum percentage of its production covered 
by such contracts. 55 The Council sets the maximum percentage 
46 Regulation 822/87, supra note 2, at art. 38. 
47 [d. at art. 42. 
48 [d. at art. 41. 
49 [d. at art. 38, '1/ 1. 
50 Commission Regulation 2721188, 19880.]. (L 241) 88, art. 2, '1/ 1. This quantity is 
set at a certain volume per hectare. [d. For example, the Commission set the quantity 
limit per producer at 13 hectolitres per hectare for the 1990/91 wine year. Commission 
Regulation 2273/90, 19900.]. (L 204) 49, art. 1, '1/1. 
51 Regulation 822187, supra note 2, at art. 38, '1/ 2. 
52 Kortteinen, supra note 4, at 507. 
53 "Representative price" refers to: (1) for certain types of wine, the weighted average 
of all average prices; and (2) for certain other types of wine, the weighted average of half 
of the average prices. Regulation 822/87, supra note 2, at art. 30, '1/ 1. 
54 [d. at art. 42, '1/'1/ 1-2, art. 28. 
55 [d. at art. 42, '1/ 3. 
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which may not exceed 18 percent. 56 The buying-in prices are 90 
percent of the relevant guide price for all white table wines and 
91.5 percent of the relevant guide price for all red table wines.57 
This distillation measure, often referred to as a "price support 
guarantee," is designed to guarantee producers a disposal price. 58 
Not surprisingly, producers find this the most attractive distilla-
tion measure. 59 
Finally, producers subject to compulsory distillation of table 
wines may distill additional quantities.60 Producers may also opt 
for distillation even when not subject to compulsory distillation 
of table wines if the Council decides such additional distillation 
is appropriate for the year in question.61 This option is known as 
"support distillation."62 Under this measure, the Council sets the 
maximum quantity, not to exceed 6.2 million hectolitres, that may 
be distilled in a given year.63 If the quantity set by the Council 
proves inadequate, the Council may increase the maximum quan-
tity above 6.2 million hectolitres.64 The Council may also restrict 
the availability of support distillation to producers who have ex-
ercised preventive distillation65 to certain table wines66 and to 
certain regions.67 The buying-in price payable to producers is 82 
percent of the relevant guide price.68 Support distillation basically 
provides a catch-all distillation measure available at the option of 
the producer. 
II. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DISTILLATION MEASURES 
As it stands, the EC relies on the wine distillation measures as 
the principal means of addressing the wine surplus within the 
Community.69 Despite the measures taken, however, the wine 
56Id. 
57Id. 
58 See Special Report, supra note 3, at 22; see also Kortteinen, supra note 4, at 507. 
59 Special Report, supra note 3, at 22. 
60 Regulation 822/87, supra note 2, at art. 41, ~ 1. 
61Id. at art. 41, ~ 2. 
62 See Kortteinen, supra note 4, at 507; Special Report, supra note 3, at 22. 
63 Regulation 822/87, supra note 2, at art. 41, ~ 5. 
64Id. at art. 41, ~ 5. 
65Id. at art. 41, ~ 3. 
66 Id. at art. 41, ~ 7. 
67Id. 
68Id. at art. 41, ~ 6. 
69 Special Report, supra note 3, at 34; see Kortteinen, supra note 4, at 506. 
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surplus continues to exist. 70 There are two main reasons for the 
ineffectiveness of the distillation measures: they fail to provide 
sufficient incentives to producers to reduce production, and they 
convert the wine surplus problem into another problem.7l 
A. Inadequacy of Incentives to Reduce Production 
First, the distillation measures are inherently flawed with re-
spect to the goals they strive to achieve. Distillation was originally 
intended as a temporary measure designed to address short-term 
imbalances.72 It deals with the surplus problem after the fact-it 
eliminates surplus only after surplus exists and does not prevent 
the creation of surplus. Thus, distillation is a reactive measure 
which fails to address the root of the problem.73 
Moreover, distillation aid or the possibility of surrendering 
distilled products to an intervention agency contingent solely on 
the alcoholic strength of the distilled products can facilitate the 
production of undesirable wines. Wines of low alcoholic content 
usually imply higher yields. Distillation measures which treat such 
wines favorably encourage an increase in their production.74 Fur-
thermore, basing distillation options on alcoholic strength is con-
ducive to the fraudulent increase of the alcohol content of the 
wines delivered for distillation. 75 Thus, rather than providing for 
proper safeguards to ensure that the distillation measures serve 
their intended purpose, the measures lend themselves to easy 
manipulation for producers disinclined to reduce or stop pro-
duction. 
Second, the distillation measures arguably promote production 
of undesirable table wine. By guaranteeing an outlet for otherwise 
unmarketable table wine, the measures encourage the continued 
production of table wine. 76 Moreover, the buying-in prices for 
the different measures are frequently quite attractive relative to 
70 See Special Report, supra note 3, at 34; Commission Proposals, supra note 5, at 77. 
The Community structural surplus is about 20 Mio hectolitres annually which was 20 
percent of table wine production in 1987. Special Report, supra note 3, at 34. An estimate 
that the surplus could achieve 25 percent of production by the 1992/93 wine year has 
been made. Commission Proposals, supra note 5, at 77. 
7I See Special Report, supra note 3, at 34-38. 
72 See Kortteinen, supra note 4, at 509. 
73 See id. 
74 Special Report, supra note 3, at 44; see Commission Proposals, supra note 5, at 82. 
75 Special Report, supra note 3, at 35; see Commission Proposals, supra note 5, at 84. 
76 Special Report, supra note 3, at 34. 
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market prices.77 Distillation supplementary to long-term storage 
contracts offers a buying-in price in excess of 90 percent of the 
guide price of any given table wine. This usually guarantees a 
price far greater than the corresponding market price.78 Even 
compulsory distillation of table wines, which guarantees produc-
ers only 50 percent of the relevant guide price, offers an attractive 
price to producers in some regions. 79 Thus, the distillation mea-
sures not only make it viable to continue in the wine producing 
industry notwithstanding adverse market forces, but it also makes 
it attractive. 
B. Conversion of the Wine Surplus into an Alcohol Surplus 
By converting surplus wine into alcohol, the EC only creates 
another problem for itself: a surplus in the alcohol market.80 
Alcohol can be created in a variety of ways, the most expensive 
of which is through the distillation of wine.81 Because alcohol 
created from the distillation of wine is relatively expensive, alco-
hol so produced is the first to be stored rather than sold on the 
open market. 82 These accumulated stocks, in turn, create an im-
balance in the alcohol market.83 Thus, distillation does not elim-
inate the wine surplus but rather converts it into an alcohol 
surplus. 
III. PROPOSALS FOR MORE EFFECTIVE METHODS 
In order for the EC to address effectively the wine surplus, it 
must concentrate on structural reform and decrease its heavy 
reliance on distillation measures. The wine surplus is due to 
structural causes and thus needs structural remedies. Two factors 
have created the wine surplus: increased production of table wine 
and decreased consumption of wine.84 Because the decrease III 
77 See id. at 35; Commission Proposals, supra note 5, at 80-81. 
78 Special Report, supra note 3, at 35. 
79Id. at 36. 
80 See Kortteinen, supra note 4, at 517; Special Report, supra note 3, at 35. 
81 Kortteinen, supra note 4, at 517; Special Report, supra note 3, at 35. 
82Id. As of August 1986, accumulated alcohol stock within the Community equaled 
13.4 million hectolitres. Id. 
83 Kortteinen, supra note 4, at 517. In a recent effort to move some of the alcohol stock, 
the Commission tendered 20,000 hectolitres of alcohol stock for sale for export to the 
Caribbean region in 1991. Alcohol: Latest Tenders for Sales for Use as Motor Fuel, EUROPE 
ENERGY, Feb. 8, 1991, available in LEX IS, Nexis Library, Inti File. 
84 See Commission Proposals, supra note 5, at 77. 
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consumption is a function of the largely uncontrollable variable 
of consumer taste, measures designed to reduce production are 
the soundest methods for eliminating the wine surplus and re-
storing equilibrium to the wine market. Such measures should 
include a vigorous grubbing-up policy and stringent planting and 
replanting rights. 85 Better administration and stricter enforce-
ment of Community programs are also needed.86 
A vigorous grubbing-up policy, which compels producers to 
dig up their vines, is the most important measure the EC can 
take. Currently, the EC promotes grubbing-up for both the ces-
sation of farming and the conversion of land use to other cropS.87 
Cessation of farming is aimed at older farmers-ages 55 through 
65-through the provision of premiums and annual allowances.88 
To promote conversion of land use to other crops, the EC pro-
vides financial aid to those making such conversions.89 These 
measures, although a step in the right direction, are inappro-
priately structured. 
As for the promotion of the cessation of farming, older farmers 
are the wrong group to target. Presumably, they will retire rela-
tively soon without incentives, to be replaced by younger farmers. 
It is the younger farmers who are expected to continue producing 
wine for many years that should be targeted. Diverting these 
farmers away from wine production is the best way of reducing 
the number of producers.9o 
Promotion of conversion of land use to other crops is also ill-
advised. Experience demonstrates that producers convert to 
other crops-typically fruit crops-which also are subject to sur-
plus problems.91 Thus, such conversion parallels the problematic 
conversion of the wine surplus into an alcohol surplus which 
arises from the distillation measures; rather than eliminating the 
problem, it shifts it to another farming sector.92 
A better grubbing-up policy would encourage the cessation of 
farming among producers who are otherwise expected to pursue 
85 See Kortteinen, supra note 4, at 513-14; Commission Proposals, supra note 5, at 77. 
86 See Commission Proposals, supra note 5, at 84; see also Kortteinen, supra note 4, at 
516; Special Report, supra note 3, at 32-34. 
87 See Kortteinen, supra note 4, at 514. 
88 [d. 
89 [d. 
90 See id. 
91 [d. 
92 See supra text accompanying notes 82-85. 
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wine~producing careers. Such a policy should include education 
programs that give producers skills in other expanding industries, 
especially newly-developing industries, and thus provide produc-
ers with the ability to cease farming. The incentive to enter such 
programs could come from the reduction or abolition of distil-
lation measures which currently guarantee producers prices for 
their wine. The money saved from the down-sized distillation 
program, in turn, could help finance the education programs. 
Such a policy would benefit more members of society, rather than 
merely guaranteeing an income for farmers, the current empha-
sis of the Community's response. 
In conjunction with a vigorous grubbing-up policy, the use of 
stringent planting and replanting rights can help focus wine pro-
duction on meeting consumer demands. The trend in consumer 
tastes shows a move toward quality wine, a drink for savoring, 
and away from table wine, a drink for swigging.93 Thus, the EC 
should substantially restrict replanting rights for vines producing 
table wine and prohibit new plantings of the same vines. 94 In 
1984, the Council passed a regulation prohibiting new plantings 
of both table wine and quality wine vines until the 1990-91 wine 
year. 95 The EC should continue this measure because it helps 
control table wine production. New planting rights for quality 
wine vines, however, should be granted as needed to meet grow-
ing consumer demand for quality wine. In this manner, the EC 
can tailor the various types of vine holdings based on grape 
variety to consumer demand. 
Finally, better administration and stricter enforcement of Com-
munity programs is needed. Administration and enforcement has 
been carried out by an ad hoc mix of bodies within Member 
States subject to little oversight at the Community level.96 In 1987, 
the EC finally established a vineyard register to serve as a clear-
inghouse of information on vine holdings and production within 
the Community. The register was a key step toward better ad-
ministration, enabling the storage of accurate data on wine pro-
duction.97 The EC also should require each Member State to 
establish a specialized agency to administer the wine regime pro-
93 Briget Bloom, Curing the EC's Alcohol Problem, FIN, TIMES, Nov, 30, 1988, § 1, at 40. 
94 See Kortteinen, supra note 4, at 513. 
95[d. 
96 See Commission Proposals, supra note 5, at 84. 
97 Kortteinen, supra note 4, at 515; Commission Proposals, supra note 5, at 84. 
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grams.98 Furthermore, the Community, as a whole, should estab-
lish a specialized agency with oversight powers over the Member 
State agencies.99 In this manner, a cohesive agenda can be 
planned and implemented from the top down. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the 1970s, the EC has been plagued by a surplus in wine 
which is mainly due to increased production and decreased con-
sumption. One of the principal means of addressing this problem 
has been the use of distillation measures which convert wine 
surplus into alcohol. The distillation measures, however, were 
originally intended as temporary remedies designed to address 
short-term imbalances and are reactive in nature. Thus, they have 
failed to eliminate the wine surplus because they do not provide 
sufficient incentives to producers to reduce production. In order 
for the EC to combat this phenomenon effectively, it must pursue 
more vigorously structural reforms which attack the root of the 
problem. Such reform measures should include a grubbing-up 
policy, stringent planting and replanting rights, and better ad-
ministrative mechanisms. Until the EC uses less reactive distilla-
tion measures and concentrates on structural reform, the wine 
surplus will continue to plague the Community wine market. 
98 Commission Proposals, supra note 5, at 84. 
99 [d. 
Lisa Hirai 
